Translated by Timothy S. Murphy
Richard Pinhas: I have a series of questions which come from a very precise domain, the musical domain, but which open upon much more general problems, and I would like, if possible, to have replies of a general order and not ones particularly centered on music. I’m starting from what is easiest for me. The first question bears on a problem of time. It seemed to me that there were two predominant, principal types of time, in short two categories which are called Chronos and Aion; I started off on a “reflection” on the positions of the sceptical school. Broadly they say that time, being neither engendered nor unengendered, neither finite nor infinite, time does not exist. It’s a form of paradox, and it is found only at another level, in certain books, one finds [retrouve] a certain form of paradox uniting two forms of filiation: at the level of time, there is a part born of Aion and a part born of Chronos, and the typical paradox would be the position of the philosopher Meinong, who arrived at paradoxes of this sort: squared circle, unextended matter, perpetuum mobile, things like that.
What I asked myself is: can one not attend [assister]—and I have the impression that in certain musical procedures one attends to this, perhaps one can generalize it or at least rediscover it in other domains—to a kind of process which I call for the moment a process of metalization [mÈtallisation], a metallic process which would affect for example the repetitive musical syntheses, and which would be a kind of mixture (of course, this notion of mixture remains to be defined), and where one would have a time which would be both continuous and event-ual [ÈvÈnementiel], which would be at the same time of the order of the continuum, which would be or which, rather, in certain respects, would cover—and I see it as a very particular form of Aion—this would be a non-barbarous mixed form because this would be a singular form to be defined, and which would be at the same time born of an uninterrupted line, from something which is not of the order of the event, which would be perhaps to reconcile [rapprocher] the chronological order, and which, from another side, would be proper to Stoic time, that is to say to the infinitive line and to an empty form of the present?
I wanted to know if this form of mixture could be found. It’s a mixture which would be situated on the side of Aion, but which would be a very singular qualification of Aion. And I have the impression, at the level of music, that one finds this time in a pulsed time, which is paradoxical, therefore a pulsed time on the side of Aion, which strolls about like that on an infinitive line, and that this pulsed time, by a series of extremely strong displacements, I’m thinking specifically of the music of Philip Glass, continuous displacement for example at the level of accentuations, this displacement would happen to produce an extra dimension. It could be called as you wish: a dimension + 1, a superpower [surpuissance] dimension, a dimension of superexecution [sureffectuation]…of extremely powerful [puissante] execution which would be even more interesting in certain respects than the notion of non-pulsed time which, itself a priori, would be situated on the side of Aion. Therefore, on the basis of this mixture or kind of interface between different times, between connected and differential lines of execution, one would attend to the innovation of this kind of time, which is a particular form of Aion, and which borrows some elements from a chronological time. Within the same idea, I have the impression that, on the basis of this pulsed time, which is directly opposed to the non-pulsed time of which Boulez, and a whole musical school, speaks, I have the impression that it is on the basis of a certain form of pulsed time (of course there are certain restrictions) that one happens to see executed movements of speed and slowness and extremely important differential executions. It’s on the basis of a certain form of pulsed time—and not on the basis of a non-pulsed time contradictory examples could of course be found)—one is going to find executions of movements of speed and slowness and even more important differentials than in non-pulsed music. Once more, I’m thinking
of the music of Philip Glass, and certain Englishmen, they make repetitive metallic music, they really play on the sequences, on the variations of speed inside these sequences, on the displacement of accents that are always inside these sequences, and who, at the level of a whole musical piece or even a whole diagram, they are going to make the speeds of the sequences vary, they are going to produce interferences or even resonances, not merely harmonic ones but resonances of speed between sequences which will melt away [s'Ècouler] in the same moment, at different speeds, if necessary it will be the same sequence which will be accelerated or even slowed down, reduced, then superimposed one on the other. There are numerous possible movements. Paradoxically as well, this play of speeds, which is extremely interesting, this execution of movements of speed, will be found on the side of a certain pulsed time, by locating it on the side of Aion. This is the first question: can this type of mixed time be seen to arise elsewhere than in music, what can the value and efficacy of this type of mixture be?
Gilles Deleuze: You have introduced a word which, I’m sure, has intrigued everyone: metallic synthesis. What is it?
Richard: It’s merely the name that I would like to give to this form of time.
Gilles: You would call it metallic synthesis?
Richard: I would call it rather a metallic form of Aion. It’s a metalized Aion. It’s a name which has been claimed by this music and it’s a name which goes [collerait] well with this kind of mixture. Metallic is a term that one finds often. The second thing that interests me comes from the problem which gives rise to a whole musical school, in reading Sch–nberg’s book, one notices that he adopts a certain point of view. One rediscovers the same themes, moreover, from Sch–nberg to Boulez, the same theoretical themes: of course, there’s the apology for the series, for structure, a whole pile of things that we like a lot here, and relations between (discrete) elements, it’s the viewpoint of structuralism in music, I say this very crudely. What appears to be extremely important is that Sch–nberg seems to construct his music on the basis of a term which he himself employs, he employs many very Freudian terms: he calls his music a system of “construction,” he explains that what matters are problems of form, broadly the affections of these forms, the variety of forms, images, sketches, themes, motives and transformations. In relation to this system of construction that could be opposed to the complex notion of assemblages [agencements], the latter comes under another point of view, a totally different perspective, in an assemblage for example, the sounds would have value for themselves etc….This system of construction is built on the process of “variation.” From Sch–nberg to Boulez, these contemporary composers utilize a process which is called variation and which will permit them to find a new form of articulation between the musical sequences or series. What is extremely interesting is that this process of variation functions with the aid of two operations which Sch–nberg himself calls “condensation” and “juxtaposition.” These two notions, like that of construction, find a bizarre resonance in psychoanalytic theory, in the form of displacement and condensation, or metaphor and metonymy. I’m saying this merely to try rapidly to define [cerner] this type of music which excludes from the outset lines of force, rhythmic complexity, systems of accentuations, harmonic resonances, sound value taken for itself, repetition as positive principle, work on sound, compositions beyond [hors] structural unity etc.Sch–nberg’s great haunting fear is repetition. He rejected it above all. Intervals, sequences, what he himself calls “cells,” the problem is that of transitions. For him, two schools exist: there are those who proceed by variations, he claims to draw upon this school, and there are those whom he doesn’t like and who proceed by juxtaposition or even by simple repetition. One sees that, in one case as in the other, these are two types of writing or of composition which respond to something, which could be called here a fundamental plane, and an execution of lines coded in segments. In this type of composition, it seems to me that the musicians of metallic music, “those I like,” proceed by a totally different mode which allows, it’s a diagrammatic mode of composition which allows sequential logics, a treatment of sounds, multiple variables of writing, different principles of repetition, extremely powerful lines of execution, sonorous mutations, becomings-molecular, relations of attraction and repulsion between the sounds and perhaps between the sequences, movements of speed and slowness, etc. Among which are differentiations of musical time. That is, rather, a mutant flux music on thresholds, as you have tried to tell us. And I have the impression that this music, which entails a whole pile of fundamental resonances and in fact very important moves [jeux] of differentiation, this music is a music which proceeds by “translations” [ translations], in opposition to a music which would proceed by variations or by juxtapositions, or by simple repetitions. Broadly I would try to oppose a music which proceeds by transitions, the serial and neo-serial school, to a totally different music which would proceed perhaps by translations. But it happens that the notion of translation, which remains for us to define, is a notion which belongs to a certain “philosophical” domain. I would like for you to tell us what you think of this opposition on the one hand, and on the other hand, for you to give us a definition of the notion of translation.
Gilles Deleuze: You’re the one who’s introducing this notion of translation. In what music do you find it?
Richard: I couple this notion of translation with those of interference and harmonic resonance. It’s a music that plays tirelessly with speeds, slownesses, strong differentiations or a complex repetition, or even both at once, there’s nothing exclusive about it, it’s a music which is built on totally inclusive syntheses. I suppose that it’s the music I like, it goes from Hendrix to Phil Glass by way of Ravel, Reich, Fripp and Eno.
Gilles: It makes a large group of problems, it’s very good. Shall we begin right here?
One thing disturbed me in what we did last time. We had spoken of the notions of mass and class, and of their utilization from the point of view of the problems which occupied us, and I tried to say a certain number of things. And then Guattari in turn said a certain number of things, and I was struck that we said opposite things. I told myself that it’s perfect, but have those who listened been as sensitive as me, or was it the opposite? Well then, we commence upon this story of time. It would be necessary to find a definition of “pulsation,” or else we cannot be understood. Or shall we bypass the difference between a pulsed time and a non-pulsed time? It’s quite variable.
Richard: But my question doesn’t bear on pulsed or non-pulsed time, I used that as an ornament, it actually bears on a notion of time, that is could one, on the basis of the difference between Chronos and Aion, on the basis of this absolutely irreversible or unfathomable [non creusable] difference, could one happen to find a form of time participating in Aion, and belonging to it, and with what specific characteristics?
Gilles: This is what’s good in discussions, it’s like we don’t put the accent on the same bits, this is what makes them useful. Me, I believe on the contrary that the idea of pulsation is not something ornamental in what you said. It’s the distribution [rÈpartition] of pulsed and non-pulsed which commands, for me, the whole set of problems you are posing. Chronos, Aion, it’s a notion that has a whole history within the history of philosophy. Chronos, broadly it’s chronological time, as the Greeks said, Chronos is the number of movement; Aion is time also, but it’s a much less simple time to understand. Broadly, pulsed time is the order of Chronos. Our question, broadly, is: is there another time, non-pulsed time for example, very well we will take the word Aion. The Stoics took the Aion-Chronos distinction very far, and for them Chronos is a time of bodies, and Aion is a time of the incorporeal. But the incorporeal is not spirit. I propose to start again [rÈpartir] from the very notion of pulsation in order that we try to have a clear time of departure. If I should try to say that a time is pulsed, this is evidently not its periodicity: there are irregular pulsations. It’s therefore not at the level of a chronometric regularity that I could define pulsed time or Chronos. The domain of Chronos, for the moment and by convenience, I identify Chronos and pulsed time, therefore Chronos is not regularity, it’s not periodicity. Once again, there are perfectly irregular pulsations. I propose to say that you have a pulsed time when you find yourself always before three coordinates. It suffices that there be only one of the three. A pulsed time is always a territorialized time; regular or not, it’s the number of the movement of the step that marks a territory: I cover [parcours] my territory! I can cover it in a thousand ways, not necessarily in a regular rhythm. Each time that I cover or haunt a territory, each time that I claim a territory as mine, I appropriate a pulsed time, or I beat [pulse] a time. I would say that the simplest musical form of pulsed time is not the metronome, neither is it whatever chronometry, it’s the ritornello [ritournelle], namely this thing which is not yet musical, it’s the little ritornello. The little ritornello of the child, it can even have a relatively complex rhythm, it can have a metronomy, an irregular metrology, it’s from pulsed time because it’s fundamentally the way in which a sonorous form, however simple it may be, marks a territory. Each time that there is a marking of a territoriality, there will be a pulsation of time. The cadastral survey is a pulsation of time. This is the first
characteristic. A movement of deterritorialization is at the same time the release [dÈgagement] of a non-pulsed time. When great musicians seize hold of a child’s little ritornello, there are two ways in which they can seize it: either they make a collage of it, at such a moment in the development or unfolding [dÈroulement] of their work they fling you a little ritornello, for example: Berg, Wozzeck. In this case it’s above all of the collage type, the astonishing thing is that the work ends right there. It happens as well that a folkloric theme is tacked into a work, just as it happens that a becoming-animal is tacked into a work. Messiaen recording birdsongs.
Mozart’s birds are not the same thing, it’s not a collage; it happens that at the same time that the music becomes bird, the bird becomes something other than a bird, there is a bloc of becomings here, two dissymetrical becomings: the bird becomes something other than music, at the same time that the music becomes bird. There are certain moments in Bartok when the folkloric themes are flung out, and then there is something totally different, when the folkloric theme is taken into a bloc of becomings. In this case, it is truly deterritorialized by the music: Berio. A musican like Schumann: ultimately [ý la limite], we could say that all the sonorous forms are more or less borrowed from little ritornellos, and at the same time, the result is that these ritornellos are traversed by a movement of musical deterritorialization which makes us agree, in a time which is no longer precisely the pulsed time of the territory. Therefore, here is the first difference between pulsed and non-pulsed or between Chronos and Aion. And then there is a second difference: I would say that there is pulsation whenever time measures—territoriality is a notion of scansion, a territory is always something scanned—whenever you can fix [ assigner] a state of development of a form and when time is used now no longer to scan a territory but to punctuate [rythmer] the development of a form. This is again the domain of Chronos. It has nothing to do with regularity. Pulsed time: it will not suffice to define it by a rhythm in general, or by a chronicity in general or by a chronometry in general. Whenever time is like the number of the development of a form…Biological time, obviously: a biological form which passes… It’s not by chance that biologists and embryologists thus encounter the problem of time and encounter it in a variable way following each species, according to the succession of living forms, growth, etc. The same in music, as soon as you can fix a sonorous form, determinable by its internal coordinates, for example melody-harmony, as soon as you can fix a sonorous form endowed with intrinsic properties, this form is subject to developments, by which it is transformed into other forms or enters into relation or again is connected to other forms, and here, following these transformations and these connections, you can fix pulsations of time.
Therefore the second characteristic of a pulsed time for me is a time which marks the temporality of a form in development.The third characteristic: there is Chronos when time marks or measures, or scans, the formation of a subject. In German this would be Bildung: the formation of a subject. Education. Education is a pulsed time. Sentimental education. It permits us to see again many things that were said: recollection [souvenir] is an agent of pulsation. Psychoanalysis is a formidable enterprise of the pulsation of time.
Richard: When you say that, you render pulsed time absolutely sad. Even if your definition of pulsed time is right, things are not as clear-cut nor as obvious. I take an example: a work by Philip Glass, “Music in changing parts,” it’s a pulsed music, there are extremely measured, extremely subjectivized, or rather extremely segmented sequences, and it happens that in this music, outside of the work on harmonic resonances, and it’s very important because it’s entirely situated on the side of an incorporeal, one has a whole series of displacements of accents, accents of strong beats [temps] or secondary beats becoming strong, or else beats of resonance which rise up just like that, not at all in an aleatory manner, it could have been aleatory, but in this case it isn’t that, and these accentuations come to form practically an involution of a chronological time—as Claire said—and which disorganize, but in the sense of organic time, which disorganize therefore the organic body of something like the melody or harmonies. One attends precisely to a process of metalization which comes back to exacerbate certain lines of flight and to engage a becoming-molecular in something which belonged to a chronological time. Then, one has a basic form, that can be called open-structured [structurelle] or structural [structural], subjectivized or subjectivizable, that can be called segmented or not, in short, everything we don’t like, namely a chronological time, and on the other side, one has a process which comes completely to form an involution of this bit. And it’s done perhaps with a surplus of measure, or with a mad measure, a kind of measure that plays precisely on the differences of speeds and which comes to get mixed up in this kind of chronological time. But if from the outset you say that every element of chronological time is negative, it closes many doors open to a transformation or to a metamorphosis of something which, a priori, is essentially, I would not say nihilist, because a nihilist essence is transformable only with difficulty, but an essence not totally finished off on the side of a becomingmolecular.
(Gilles: hee, hee, hee.) You’re going to have a lot of trouble defining non-pulsed time because even in the least pulsed time possible, one would be able to find something pulsed, pulsation or the inmost, infinitely small mark of the stroke of the bow on the violin, or something of the sort. And ultimately, this would be very easy, this would be an exercise in style or a theoretical game of composing and of executing a music which will theoretically be on the side of a non-pulsed time, but which in fact will not bear in itself any line of flight and any possible becoming; which will be in essence completely nihilist.
Gilles: You’ll see, we agree. We don’t have the same method at all, because if what you mean is: don’t go right into your definitions, wanting to make us feel that, in advance, everything which isn’t good is on the side of pulsed time. At first, we don’t know. You’ve made a bit of a plea for reintroducing the beauties of pulsed time. I am saying a slightly different thing, namely that it goes without saying that one never finds oneself facing anything but mixtures. I don’t believe that anyone whatsoever could live in a non-pulsed time, for the simple reason that he would literally die there. Likewise, when we spoke at length of the body without organs, and the necessity of making ourselves one, I never thought that one could live without the organism. Likewise, no question of living without relying on and being territorialized on a pulsed time, which permits us the minimum development of forms of which we have need, the minimal allocations of subjects that we are, because subjectivation, organism, pulsation of time, these are the conditions of living. If one leaps over that, it’s what we call a suicide. Certain deaths by drugs are typical of it: the organism leaped. It’s a suicidal enterprise. Therefore, on this point, I would tell you that it’s very obvious that, in this case, one finds oneself in a mixture of pulsed time and non-pulsed time. The question is: once the mixture is given, I consider that our task is to see what comes back to one such element of the mixture or to another.
Therefore, if one is not held back and reterritorialized somewhere, one breaks out, but what we keep, taking this into account, what interests me is the other aspect. When Richard tells me that there is something good in pulsed time, I say that it depends: does this mean that pulsed time is absolutely necessary and that you won’t live without it, then OK…The Wagnerian leitmotive, what does it mean? In the case of the mixture that occupies us, one sees well in what way the leitmotive in Wagner is typical of a pulsed time. Why? Because, and it’s thus that many conductors interpret Wagner, understood and executed the leitmotive, it has in fact all the characteristics that we have just determined, the three characteristics of pulsed time: it indicates at least the germ of a sonorous form with a strong intrinsic or interior property, and it’s executed like that; second characteristic: when Debussy made fun of the leitmotive in Wagner, he had a good formula, he said: it’s exactly like a signpost, it’s the signpost of a character, whose formatiofno r[mation] the Wagnerian drama will put on stage and in music, and the formation as subject. Parsifal formation, Lohengrin formation, it’s the Goethean side of Wagner, his lyric drama will never cease to entail the formation of the character. Third characteristic: the leitmotive is fundamentally and functionally in the music, it serves as a function of sonorous territorialization, it comes and comes again. And it’s the hero, in his formation, in his territoriality, and in the forms to which he refers, who is there, taken up in the leitmotive. Many conductors have placed the accent on these functions of the leitmotive. When Boulez plays Wagner, he has a completely different evaluation of the leitmotive. When he looks at the score [partition], he does not find such a leitmotive. Broadly he says: it’s neither the germ of an intrinsic form nor the sign i[ndicateur] of a character in formation, he holds onto these two points, he says that the leitmotive is a veritable floating theme which happens to get stuck here or there, in very different spots. There is therefore another thing as well: there is a floating theme which can float just as well over mountains as over waters, over one such character or over another, and the variations of which are going to be, not formal variations but perpetual variations of speeds, accelerations and slowdowns, I’m saying that it’s a completely different conception of the leitmotive. At the level of orchestra conducting, it’s obvious that many things will change when the Wagnerian leitmotive is understood in one way or in the other; this will obviously not be the same execution, this goes without saying, and here, I would say just like Richard that it’s not a question of obtaining a non-pulsed time in the pure state. Nonpulsed time, by definition, you can only wrest it from a pulsed time, and if you suppress all pulsation or pulsed time, then here I take over Richard’s expression, it’s pure nihilism, there’s no longer even pulsed time or time that’s not pulsed: there’s no longer anything.
Non-pulsed time you can only conquer, and because of this I insist on the inequality of status: in a certain manner, pulsed time will always be given to you, or it will be imposed on you, you will be forced to comply with it and from another side, it will order you; the other must be wrested. And here, it’s not an individual or collective problem, once again there is something common to the problem of the individual and that of the collective: the individual is a collective as much as a collective is individuated.
Question: When one makes a film, there is a screenplay, one secretes pulsed time, but this screenplay is going to situate itself in a non-pulsed time…?
Gilles: In this connection, I would say that the example of cinema is marvelous. Pulsed time covers the whole development of internal sonorous forms, therefore the screenplay, the rhythm of images in the cinema makes up part of pulsed time. The question is how to wrest a non-pulsed time and what would it mean to wrest a non-pulsed time from this system of chronological pulsation? We can seek examples. What exactly does one wrest from sonorous forms in order to obtain a nonpulsed time? It consists in wresting what from forms, or from subjects, or from territorialities? My problem of non-pulsed time becomes: wresting something from the territorialities of time, you wrest something from the temporal development of forms and you wrest something from the formation of subjects. Here, Richard… Some of us can be moved by certain voices in the cinema. Bogart’s voice. What interests us is not Bogart as subject, but how does Bogart’s voice function? What is the function of the voice in speaking him? It’s not the same function at all in the American comedy or in the detective film. Bogart’s voice, it can’t be said that this is an individualizing voice, even though it is that also, this is the pulsed aspect of it: I deterritorialize myself on Bogart. He wrests something, as though an emission—it’s a kind of metallic voice, Claire says that it’s a horizontal voice, it’s a boring voice—it’s a kind of thread which sends out a sort of very very very special sonorous particles. It’s a metallic thread that unwinds, with a minimum of intonation; it’s not at all the subjective voice. Here as well one could say that there is Bogart as character, that’s the domain of the formation of the subject, Bogart’s territories, the roles he is capable of playing, one sees again the sorts who have a raincoat like Bogart, Jean Cau, it’s obvious that he takes himself for Bogart.
Richard: Effectively we have two different methods for arriving at the same thing, that fits. But from this notion of mixture, it seems to me that you throw a kind of bridge, practically a bridge between the realms [pont inter-rËgne] of my two questions, namely that from the moment when you speak of the mixture, you arrive very quickly at the notion of translation. I would like you to explain a little bit.
Gilles: I arrive there very quickly, but I would not call it translation. If I were to try to define my non-pulsed time, Aion, or another word, the two parts of a mixture are never equal. One of the two parts is always more less given, the other is always more or less to be made. It’s for this reason that I’ve remained very Bergsonian. He said very beautiful things on that. He said that in a mixture, you never have two elements, but one element which plays the role of impurity and that one you have, it’s given to you, and then you have a pure element that you don’t have and that must be made. That’s not bad. I would say therefore that this non-pulsed time, how to produce it? It’s necessary to arrive at a concrete analysis of it. You have non-pulsed time when you have a movement of deterritorialization: example: the passage of the ritornello in its function from childlike reterritorialization to the deterritorialized ritornello in the work of Schumann. Second characteristic: you fabricate a non-pulsed time, if from the development of any form whatever, defined by intrinsic properties, you wrest particles which are defined only by their relations of speeds and slownesses, their relations of movement and rest. Not easy. If, from a form with strong intrinsic properties, you wrest indefinite [informelles] particles, which have among themselves only relations of speeds and slownesses, of movement and rest, you have wrested non-pulsed time from pulsed time. Who does a thing like that? Just now I said that it’s the musician who deterritorializes the ritornello, he makes non-pulsed time from that moment, and nevertheless he holds onto pulsed time. Who makes particles wrest themselves into a form? Immediately I say the physicists, they do only that with their machines, they would agree and I hope that there are none of them here, just like that they agree in advance: they fabricate non-pulsed time. What is a cyclotron? I say it all the more joyfully because I have no idea about it. What are these machines? These are machines for wresting particles which have only differential speeds, to the point that at this particular level, one will not call it speed, the words are different, but this isn’t our affair, from physical forms they wrest particles which have only kinematic [cinÈmatique], quantum relations, the word is so pretty, and which will be defined by speeds, extremely complex speeds. A physicist passes his time doing that.
Third characteristic of non-pulsed time: you no longer have the fixing [assignation] of a subject, there’s no more subject formation, it’s finished, death to Goethe. I tried to oppose Kleist to Goethe; Kleist, subject formation, he screws it up s[e fout] completely. It’s not his affair, his affair is a story of speeds and slownesses. I invoke the biologist. What does he do? You could be told two things: there are forms and these forms develop more or less quickly. Here, I would say that one is right in the mixture. There are forms which develop, I would say that there’s a mixture of two languages in there: there are forms which develop, this belongs to language P, language of pulsed time, more or less quickly, this is from the mixture and belongs to language non-P, language of non-pulsed time. The problem is not to render everything coherent, the question is to know [savoir] where you’re going to put the accent. Or else you’re going to give primacy to the development of the form and you’re going to say that the speeds and slownesses follow from the exigencies of the development of the form, here I could follow the history of biology and say, for example, that it has subordinated the whole play of speeds and slownesses to the theme of a form which develops, and the exigencies of a form which develops. I see others of them who, saying the same sentences—it’s for this reason that beneath the language there are such settlings of scores, it’s really at the moment when one says the same thing that it’s war, inevitably—there are biologists who, on the contrary, mean that the form and the developments of form depend solely on the speeds, on finding particles, relations of speeds and slownesses, and even if one has not yet found these particles, and it’s these relations of speeds and slownesses among ultimately indefinite particles that will command. There isn’t any reason to decide among them, but when our heart goes either to the ones or to the others, once more, one lives, all this is not theoretical, you don’t live in the same manner according to whether you develop a form or you find your way in relations of speeds and slownesses among particles, or things functioning as particles, insofar as you distribute affects. It’s not the same mode of life at all.
In biology everyone knows that there are broad differences among dogs, and yet they are part of the same species, while a cat and a tiger are not part of the same species, it’s odd. Why? What defines a species? The form and its development define a species, but from another side, you would have the non-pulsed language in which what defines a species is solely speed and slowness. Example: what makes a Saint Bernard and a nasty greyhound the same species? As they say: it breeds, it bears a living offspring. But what makes it bear a living offspring? One can’t even invoke the sizes, even when the coupling in impossible by virtue of pure dimensions, that changes nothing, in principle it’s possible. What defines its possibility? Solely its speed, the speed with which the spermatozoa arrive at the ovum, where ovulation is done. It’s solely a relation of speed and slowness, in sexuality, which defines fertilizability. While the cat and the tiger, it doesn’t work, it’s not the same period of gestation, while all dogs have the same period of gestation, the same speed of spermatozoa, the same speed of ovulation, so that however different they may be, it’s a species not by virtue of a common form nor a common development of form, although there may also be that, but the system of speed-slowness relations.
Therefore I say rapidly that the three characteristics of non-pulsed time are that you no longer have a development of the form, but a wresting of particles which have only relations of speed and slowness, you no longer have subject formation but you have hecceities; we saw this year the difference between individuations by subjectivation, the fixing of subjects, and individuations by hecceities, a season, a day. Deterritorialization. Emission of particles. Hecceities. So there’s the general formula that I would give for non-pulsed time: you really have the formation of a non-pulsed time, or else the construction of a plane of consistency, therefore, when there is the construction of what’s called a continuum of intensities, second point when there are conjugations of flux, the flux of drugs can only be practiced, for example, in relation to other fluxes, there is no monoflux machine or assemblage. Within such assemblages, there is always an emission of particles with relations of speeds and slownesses, there is a continuum of intensities and there is a conjugation of flux. At this level, it would be necessary to take a case and see how it puts these three aspects together, I could say that there is a plane of consistency here, whatever the level of the drug, whatever the level of the music, there is a plane of consistency because there is a continuum of definable intensities, you have quite a conjugation of diverse fluxes, you have quite a few emissions of particles which have only kinematic relations. It’s for this reason that the voice in cinema is so important, it can be taken as a subjectivation, but equally as a hecceity. There is the individuation of a voice which is quite different from the individualization of the subject who has it. One could take up any trouble whatever: anorexia for example… What makes anorexia, in what way does its endeavor fail, in what way does it succeed?
At the level of a study of concrete cases, is one going to find this conjugation of flux, this emission of particles. One sees well a first point. One tries to forget everything that the doctors or the psychoanalysts say about anorexia. Everyone knows that an anorexic is not someone who doesn’t eat, it’s someone who eats under a very curious regime. At first sight, this regime is an alternation, really, of emptiness and fullness. The anorexic empties herself, and she never ceases to fill herself, this already implies a certain alimentary regime. If one says: empty and full, in place of: not eating, one has already made great progress. It would be necessary to define a pessimal [pessimal] threshold and an optimal threshold. The pessimal is not necessarily the worst. I’m thinking of certain pages of Burroughs, he says that, finally, above all, it’s a story of the cold, the cold inside and the warm.